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Timothy WHITTON
Université Blaise Pascal, Clermont-Ferrand II
Ken Livingstone’s last two official biographies speak volumes about the sort of
politician he comes across as being. John Carvel’s title1 is slightly ambiguous and can
be interpreted in a variety of ways: Turn Again Livingstone suggests that the one time
leader  of the Greater  London Council (GLC) and twice elected mayor  of London
shows great skill in steering himself out of any tight corners he gets trapped in. Or,
that he is the epitome of the cunning opportunist, constantly lying in wait to seize
power.  Or  even  that  he  has  been  able  to  adapt  his  personal  style  of  politics  and
municipal socialism to fit the mood of the times. The title of Andrew Hosken’s more
recent biography2 strikes a slightly different note: by insisting on the Ups and Downs
of Ken Livingstone’s career, the author stresses his ability to constantly bounce back
often when the odds against him have been stacked up high. Whatever, there is no
denying that despite the flak, Livingstone has always seemed to be able to reinvent
himself and his defeat in the third mayoral election of 2008 has by no means sounded
his political death knell. There is indeed a chance that Livingstone might take part in
the 2012 Olympic Games opening ceremony as mayor elect rather than just another
VIP.3 
There is no denying that Livingstone has always had a special relationship with the
media and his antics and taste for provocation have constantly enabled him to be
make the headlines throughout the world. Livingstone is neither rich nor famous and
it seems as if he has come to expect therefore, that his reputation, image and career
should largely depend on the way he plays to the gallery. To this end, it is how he has
been  represented  that  has  enabled  Livingstone  to  reinvent  himself  on  countless
occasions. He would possibly like the image of “Red” Ken to be the one that sticks,
“red” as in revolutionary, always the one to be up in arms about some noble cause.
Yet, as it turns out, over time Livingstone’s colours have perhaps faded and the mast
on which they were initially nailed is less high. Playing too many fields at the same
time meant that Livingstone somehow lost his cuddly image of being “our Ken” for
Londoners.  It  was replaced by the vote losing title of “Blair’s mayor”,  associating
Livingstone  with  the  overall  disappointment  surrounding  New  Labour’s  political
project.
This  article  will  look  at  the  different  ways  in  which  Livingstone  has  been
represented in and by the media. It will emphasise his uncanny ability to fall from a
1 John CARVEL, Turn Again Livingstone. London: Profile Books, 1999.
2 Andrew HOSKEN, Ken : the Ups and Downs of Ken Livingstone. London: Arcadia Books,
2008.
3 Timothy WHITTON, Ken « le rouge » et la Mairie de Londres. Du Greater London 
Council à la Greater London Authority, Paris: l’Harmattan, 2010.
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peak of popularity into a trough of opprobrium only to spring back equally as quickly.
His popularity has always stemmed from his determination to speak his mind. In so
doing, there is no doubt that he contributed to giving the GLC and then the GLA a
sense of identity. In the first case, it just happened that Livingstone was not on the
same  wavelength  as  the  government  or  Fleet  Street  and  to  a  certain  extent  this
animosity was maintained during his time as first mayor of London.
Early days
Livingstone’s first real brush with the press came on May 8th, 1981 when after a
caucus  vote  he  was  chosen  to  lead  the  new  Labour  dominated  Greater  London
Council. On hearing the news that the labour councillors had campaigned behind the
more  rightwing  Andrew  McIntosh  but  had  then  let  the  extreme  left-winger
Livingstone become leader, the Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, immediately expressed
her scorn for this strategy by declaring that the GLC was about to impose upon this
nation a tyranny which the peoples of Eastern Europe yearn to cast aside .4 The press
went  to town over this statement  and immediately Livingstone was branded “Red
Ken” a sobriquet that was to become as permanent as the Iron Lady’s  loathing of
him.5 At first it represented Livingstone as the revolutionary who had taken over the
GLC by force but little did the press know that it was also to symbolise a declaration
of war between the conservative governments and the government of London. The
leader of the GLC understood immediately that the image of “Red Ken” would enable
him and his friends at the GLC to be constantly in the limelight, thereby giving them
and their cause immense publicity and what is more, absolutely free of charge.
After the conservative win in 1979, the Labour Party was in such disarray that Her
Majesty’s Opposition was too feeble to stop the Thatcher juggernaut. County Hall, on
the other hand, stood just a few hundred yards away across the Thames and the thirty-
six  year  old  Livingstone,  who  had  given  up  on  most  of  the  perks  afforded  to
administrators of his status, boldly claimed that the GLC would oppose the Thatcher
“regime”.6 In almost the same breath, Livingstone stated that the police were racist,
the army dangerous and that the IRA could be considered as freedom fighters. For the
time being these declarations were looked on with a form of bemused amusement by
public opinion and even when he declined an invitation to go to Charles and Diana’s
wedding declaring that he hadn’t been elected to go to Royal Weddings, people didn’t
know whether to laugh or cry.7
What the press had quite unwittingly done by promoting the idea that the new GLC
leader was a revolutionary, was to compound his meteoric climb to fame. Before May
1981,  Livingstone,  the  son  of  a  window  cleaner,  had  been  a  hospital  laboratory
technician until devoting himself full-time to his job of local labour councillor. From
this political oblivion, he now found himself in charge of the multi million pound
4 Discours de Mme Thatcher prononcé lors de la  Scottish Conservative Conference, le 8 mai
1981 à Perth City Hall.
5 London’s new chief cuts fares, boosts IRA and Outrages Establishment, The Associated Press,
September 13, 1981.
6 Including a chauffeur driven limousine. This step was to cast Livingstone as a defender of
public transport.
7 The  “wedding  of  the  century”  took  place  on  July 29th 1981.  Livingstone  released  black
balloons over London on the same day.
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budget of a capital city and in order to promote his new working class style of politics
was  prepared  to  attract  and  harness  the  full  attention  of  the  media.  Red  Ken’s
honeymoon with public opinion was nonetheless to be short lived and by the end of
August 1981, his constant refusals to condemn the terrorist acts in Northern Ireland
meant that Fleet Street unleashed its full power on him. Gone were affable references
to the almost glamorous revolutionary leader of the GLC, the “cheeky chappy” who
was  going  to  defend  the  “people”  of  London  from  Thatcher’s  neo-liberalism.
Livingstone was portrayed as being a clown, irresponsible and a “damn fool” for not
condemning  the  IRA  bombers,  especially  in  the  wake  of  the  horrific  Chelsea
barracks’ attack on 10 October.8 Red Ken had suddenly become “the most odious man
in Britain”.9 What is more,  his antics were supposedly bringing the whole Labour
Party into disrepute which of course was music to the ears of the fast rising SDP. 10
Basically,  Livingstone  had  quickly  come  to  represent  the  unacceptable  face  of
socialism and his media friendly “rent-a-quote” style was causing substantial damage
to an already strife stricken Labour Party. Livingstone was beginning to epitomise the
“loony left” that in the long term would scupper the Labour party’s ability to win any
of the next four General Elections until the scourge organised by the modernisers and
pursued relentlessly by Tony Blair.
Yet  Livingstone’s  relationship  with  the  media  was  to  prove  paramount  in
increasing his political  strength and subsequent popularity.  The truth of the matter
was that he was quite simply the most colourful politician around and could alone
substantially boost a programme’s ratings. Invitations to chat shows also meant that
he was constantly given a forum to articulately explain his points of view and justify
his standpoints and decisions. Even if people didn’t support his policies, they liked his
style, colourful language, his outspokenness and ability to be self deprecating: they
made such a change from the run of the mill politicians and their legendary sense of
being careful  about everything they said.  Livingstone on the other  hand, was fast
becoming a media star, projecting a popular image of himself and the Labour party at
the GLC. At the same time, he was defending policies that were popular too. “Ken”
was quite simply the best show in town.
From anti-establishment to anti Thatcher
Livingstone’s  first  major  foray  onto  the  stage  of  national  politics  had  firmly
established his “red” Ken reputation to the extent that some newspapers employed
journalists to follow him around on a permanent basis. Later on, Livingstone was to
fully acknowledge the fact that although many people put this down to his lack of
experience, his main aim was to get as much publicity for the GLC’s socialist policies
as  possible.11 The problem was that  the intense media coverage of  his antics  had
begun to undermine the GLC leader’s  popular appeal  and portray him as being a
8 Front page of The Sun, 13 October 1981.
9 Ibid. Livingstone was subsequently attacked in the street on his way to work and sprayed with
red paint.
10 Livingstone was possibly the target for flak initially aimed at Tony Benn and his claim to
become the deputy leader of the Labour Party. Benn had fallen ill and attention was perhaps
turned to the GLC leader.
11 John CARVEL., op. cit., p. 103.
3
“menace to stability in public life”.12 The Labour Party was feeling the side effects of
this and the GLC was being accused of dealing with matters that had very little to do
with their electoral mandate. In this respect, the first major financial clash between the
GLC  and  the  government  was  to  shift  the  focus  of  public  opinion’s  vision  of
Livingstone and enable him to firmly establish his image of being an anti Thatcher
force.
Initial confrontation basically came from the fact that Michael Heseltine, secretary
of State for the environment and one of the rising stars of the “dry” conservatives, had
a major role to play in the reduction of public spending,  a key component of the
government’s monetarist agenda. One of the GLC Labour party’s election promises
had been to cut transport fares by 25%, which they did on October 1 st. This was to be
funded by a small rise in local tax but little did the Labour faction of the GLC know
initially that this decision did not fit in with Heseltine’s bid to cap local government
spending in his overall desire to meet the governments public spending cuts. But even
if both parties were capable of envisaging confrontation, neither of them had actually
thought that the GLC’s rate cutting might be quite simply illegal.  As it happened,
members of Bromley council decided to challenge the GLC’s decision to cut fares
suggesting  that  their  rate  payers  would  have  to  accept  a  rise  that  given  their
geographic position in London, would be of little interest to them. Their legal quibble
was that councils had to act “reasonably” and they could not see why their ratepayers
should  fund  a  system  designed  to  reduce  fares  in  central  London  where  cheap
travelling would benefit  above all richer  Londoners  from the stockbroker belt and
tourists from abroad. What must be underlined here is that Livingstone’s reputation
was  largely  responsible  for  the  Bromley  councillors’  belligerency  because  they
believed that it would influence the courts in coming down on their side by declaring
the  rate  rise  “unreasonable”.  In  other  words,  it  was  thought  that  Livingstone’s
leadership of the GLC was being publicised in such a way as to influence even the
supposedly impartial courts of law.
“Fares Fair” was duly condemned on November 10th by the Law Lords who stated
that the GLC had no right to create such a deficit in public transport in London albeit
in the interests of Londoners. After the decision had been handed down, one of the
Law Lords, Lord Watkins, very aptly emphasised the role that Livingstone had played
in the decision to declare the GLC’s action unlawful:
Those  who  come  newly  to  govern  people  and  who  act  in  haste  in
wielding power to which they are unaccustomed would do well to heed
the words of  Gladstone. He knew a great deal about power, and in
1890 he said of it: ‘The true test of a man, the test of a class, the true
test of a people is power. It is when power is given into their hands that
the trial comes’.13
To add insult to injury, Livingstone’s offer to attend court hearings and explain the
GLC’s case, was turned down by even his own barristers. In his own words, “but as
in  the  previous  hearings  my  offer  was  politely  declined  on  the  grounds  that  my
presence might be offensive and inflammatory to the judges, thus prejudicing them
12 The Sun, 23 July 1981.
13 Quoted from Ken LIVINGSTONE, If Voting Changed Anything They’d Abolish It, London:
Collins, 1987, pp. 194-5.
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against  our  case”.14 Livingstone  was  indeed  managing  to  attract  a  great  deal  of
publicity  to  the  GLC’s  actions  but  his  incessant  provocation  was  not  only
undermining its credibility but also turning the pillars of the establishment against it.
The  decision  taken  by  Lords  Denning,  Oliver  and  Watkins  was  confirmed  on
appeal on December 17th and the Conservatives immediately seized the opportunity to
declare that the GLC was being run by an incompetent bunch of left-wing radicals
bent on undermining Mrs Thatcher’s governments rather than defending the interests
of Londoners. In a relatively short lapse of time, the GLC was aptly portrayed – even
abroad15 - as being in the hands of the “loony left”. To a certain extent they were
successful  because  despite  Livingstone’s  desperate  attempts  to  explain  just  how
central  government  was thwarting local  government’s  financial  leeway,  it  was the
Trotskyist inspired brand of municipal socialism that was coming to characterise the
GLC – and ultimately lead to its downfall. Perhaps the greatest symbol of the GLC’s
outright provocation was the erection, in February 1982, of huge signs on the roof of
County Hall showing the latest unemployment figures.16 
It was of course in the Conservatives’ interest to see to it that in Londoners’ minds,
the GLC should be represented as being a hot spot of profligacy where anyone or
anything remotely marginal was welcomed with open arms. GLC grants to the most
obscure groups were fully documented in the press, with “Babes against the Bomb”
being  undoubtedly the  most  exotic  and  thus  the  most  famous.17 The idea  was  to
convince the public that London deserved a well oiled team of accountants to balance
the books rather than Livingstone and his cronies bent on promoting the interests of
women’s  groups,  ethnic  minorities,  gays  and  other  campaigners  against  the white
male heterosexual order in society. As it happened, tactics were to rapidly change as
abolition of the metropolitan councils became a possible solution. To prevent the bird
from singing, the answer was to cut down the tree rather than the branch where he
was perched.
Abolition
Livingstone  had  lost  his  legal  battle  to  reduce  travel  fares  in  London  but  had
emerged  as  the  champion  of  yet  another  popular  cause.  “Red”  Ken  was  rapidly
becoming “our” Ken as Londoners would often fondly refer to him. Too often for
central government who felt that public opinion was beginning to represent “Ken” as
being the natural leader of London. Despite their attempts to represent him as persona
non grata within the capital, Livingstone seemed to be weathering the storm and in
many  ways  was  stronger  after  the  Fares  Fair  episode  than  ever  before.  But  the
government’s campaign to end the GLC’s life was to enable him to reinvent himself
again, not only as the champion of London, but of democracy itself. This time round
though,  Livingstone  was  fighting  for  survival  which  was  to  require  a  completely
different brand of showmanship.
14 Ibid., p. 196.
15 “Red Ken’s Moves Stir London Storm”, The Gobe and Mail (Canada), 3 December 1981.
16 These signs were clearly visible from the balcony of Mrs Thatcher’s office and apparently
many a foreign leader looked inquisitively at them. Legend has it that François Mitterrand was
the only dignitary to have asked explicitly what the figures meant.
17 A group of mothers who protested against the government’s nuclear weapons’ policy and
who came to rallies with their children received a £800 grant from the GLC in February 1983.
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The  Conservative  Party’s  1979  manifesto  contained  nothing  about  the
Metropolitan Councils but in 1983, they were part  of the list  of the “enemy from
within”. The manifesto claimed quite clearly that it was time to get rid of them:
[t]he  Metropolitan  Councils  and  the  Greater  London  Council  have
been shown to be a wasteful and unnecessary tier of government.  We
shall abolish them and return most of their functions to the boroughs
and districts. Services which need to be administered over a wider area
- such as police and fire, and education in inner London - will be run
by joint boards of borough or district representatives.18
This  pledge  was  repeated  in  October  in  a  White  Paper  entitled  Streamlining  the
Cities.19 
But it was at this point that the Conservatives made a fatal mistake. Elections to
renew the Councils were due in April 1985 and this date would have provided the
ideal  opportunity to get  rid  of  the Metropolitan Councils.  Yet  despite its  hostility
towards the councils, the government felt that abolition at such an early date would
have meant leaving too many ongoing projects in the lurch and so decided to maintain
the initial plan to get rid of them on April 1st 1986. To achieve abolition by this date,
another scheme was hatched and entailed using legislation to do away with the April
1985 elections. In theory, this would mean appointing officials – borough councillors
in the case of the GLC - to run the Metropolitan Councils for the remaining year. 20
These people would be hand picked and would make sure that abolition took place as
smoothly as possible and above all without dilapidating public money. As far as the
GLC was concerned this strategy was designed to prevent Livingstone and his friends
from using the local elections as a referendum against  abolition while handing the
running of the capital over to officials from the mostly conservative led boroughs for
the  last  remaining  year.  Then,  by  generously  funding  the  London  boroughs  after
abolition, the Conservative government thought it could easily convince Londoners
that abolition had been a wise decision. It must be said that at this point in time, the
Conservatives were formidable politically speaking and their main adversaries had
been all but crushed. They possibly felt too secure in the belief that the abolition of
the Councils was a foregone conclusion but they had vastly underestimated the fact
that  their solution for this “gap” year  was going to really set the cat  amongst the
pigeons.
Mrs Thatcher’s government was finding it relatively easy to peddle the image of
the  GLC as  a  layer  of  government  next  to  useless  and  what  is  more,  staffed  by
“loonies” who spent most of their time dealing with business that did not concern
them in the slightest. Livingstone’s meddling in the Northern Ireland question was a
case  in  point,  especially when he invited Sinn Féin members  to County Hall  and
supported the “Troops Out” movement. The message to public opinion was that the
everyday preoccupations of Londoners such as housing, policing, social services and
refuse collection were already being dealt with by other authorities so that getting rid
18 http://www.conservative-party.net/manifestos/1983/1983-conservative-manifesto.shtml
19 Command Paper 9063, HMSO, 1983.
20 This choice was severely criticised by Edward Heath who despite supporting abolition for the
GLC, found it outrageous that his party should try to replace a democratically elected body by 
an indirectly appointed one. See Hansard, 11 April 1984, cols. 402-484.
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of the GLC would have very little impact on them. But the truth of the matter is that
whether  the government’s  condemnation of the GLC was legitimate or not,  under
Livingstone’s command it had gradually become an efficient fighting machine in its
attempts to oppose Thatcherism. Livingstone was constantly available for the press
and GLC officials had become dab hands in developing propaganda that was friendly
to their cause. This time round, however, it was democracy itself that the GLC would
be defending in its last ditch battle for survival in which Livingstone was to excel. In
the words of Andrew Hosken:
[b]ut Livingstone has been always at his best fighting against the odds
and he managed to outmanoeuvre the government through one of the
most brilliant political campaigns seen in post-war Britain. It did not
come cheap but he succeeded in humiliating a powerful  government
machine and a seemingly omnipotent prime minister – not for the last
time.21
Basically it did not matter that much what the GLC said and did during the campaign
against abolition given the conservative majority in Parliament. Legislation was going
to go through by hook or by crook: what really mattered was the impact this campaign
was going to have on people’s careers, especially Livingstone’s. In order to establish
his  future  as  a  key  player  within  the  Labour  Party,  Livingstone  had  to  represent
himself as being prepared to fight a battle as if he could win the war even though he
knew full well that chances of success were very slim. He had to for his own sake as
much as for the GLC’s.
The  fight  to  defend  the  GLC  in  the  name of  democracy  soon  found  an  ideal
representation with the slogan: Say No to No Say. The façade of County Hall was the
ideal place to placard this message and Livingstone’s team set about explaining to
public opinion that London would soon be the only European capital without a central
authority.  To  achieve  this,  the  GLC was  everywhere,  stickers  on  dustbins,  traffic
lights, fire stations and engines, rubbish dumps and even behind the goalposts during
an  away football  match  between  Rumania  and  England.  Gradually  the  GLC was
opening Londoners’ eyes to the fact that after abolition, London wide affairs would be
run by faceless bureaucrats: “[b]y awakening public antipathy towards the Whitehall
bureaucracy, the campaign contrived to make people believe that the GLC was local,
accessible,  friendly and democratic”.22 Livingstone too was particularly keen to be
represented in exactly the same way because the end of the GLC meant a return for
him into political oblivion.
The GLC’s campaign worked quite well and gradually the tide was turning in its
favour:  polls  were  beginning  to  show that  a  majority  of  Londoners  did not  think
abolition was a good idea.23 Also, in a relatively short time Livingstone had managed
to reinvent himself and from “the most odious man in Britain”, was being referred to
as “our Ken” by Londoners and “cuddly Ken” by the media. “Our” because for once,
even people who had good reason to dislike Livingstone were coming round to the
idea that this time round he was actually defending something important for London,
21 Andrew HOSKEN, op. cit., pp. 193-194.
22 John Carvel, op. cit., p. 173.
23 See Andrew FORRESTER et al., Beyond our Ken, a Guide to the Battle for London, London,
Fourth Estate Ltd., 1985, p. 80.
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a far cry from his “lesbian/IRA” approach to most causes. The GLC had managed to
convince  Londoners  that  this  whole  issue  was  about  democracy,  not  about
Livingstone. And “cuddly” because he was every chat show and television presenter’s
dream;  with  Livingstone  on  the  agenda,  ratings  went  through  the  ceiling  and
attendances  at  public  meetings  had never  been  better.  Livingstone  was the crowd
puller of the times and stopped at nothing to attract the public’s attention to the GLC’s
achievements24.
And  this  is  precisely  what  he  managed  to  do  when  after  a  rough  ride  in  the
Commons25, the government’s legislation to replace the council’s elected members by
appointed borough councillors was defeated in the Lords: the GLC pulled out all the
stops to  make sure that  enough  peers  were  available  in  order  to  vote against  the
Paving Bill26 on 28 June 1984 and force  the government  to  backtrack.  What  had
particularly  got  the  Lords’  goat  was  the  fact  that  the  government  considered  the
abolition of the Metropolitan Councils as a  fait accompli: it rather naively believed
that legislation to appoint officials to run the councils for the last year could be voted
before the final  legislation concerning abolition. Egged on by Livingstone and his
well briefed team at the GLC, the Lords were astounded at such arrogance and were
quick to question what would happen should abolition be refused and the GLC left in
the  hands  of  officials  appointed  by  Parliament.  Given  the  parliamentary  agenda,
Patrick Jenkin, Secretary of State for the Environment who was responsible for the
legislation had no other choice but to recommend that the current GLC councillors’
mandate be prolonged by one year taking them up to the planned date of abolition on
April  1st 1986.  Time  was  indeed  running  short  and  despite  her  loathing  of
Livingstone, the prime minister could but agree. The Local Government Bill was duly
amended and approved by Parliament.
Following their refusal  to adopt the Bill,  a new banner floated from the top of
County  Hall  expressing  the  GLC’s  thanks  to  the  Lords  for  saving
democracy.27Livingstone instantly became a real folk hero: the “people’s Ken” had
successfully led the modest GLC to a form of victory over the Thatcher juggernaut.
Little  did anybody know that  fifteen years  later  his struggle  to defend democracy
would be repeated, but this time round, he was to take on his own party.
From cuddly Ken to citizen Ken
The GLC was duly abolished as planned but not before it had used its final year to
empty its coffers giving preferential treatment, as was to be expected, to a multitude
of  colourful  associations  and  Labour  controlled  boroughs.  Subsequently,  the
24 Even so, some of Livingstone’s political acquaintances were aghast that he should bow so
low to the Queen when she opened the Thames Barrier. “The GLC; Ken and Queen turn the
tide”, The Economist, 12 May 1984.
25 Despite opposition even within the ranks of the Conservatives (see note 21), the government 
majority and the efficiency of the Whips were such that there was little stopping the Commons’
approving the legislation.
26 Called so because it was supposed to “pave the way” to abolition of the Metropolitan 
Councils. The real name was “Local Government Bill”.
27 This message was hammered home even further on 6 March 1985 when the GLC celebrated
« Democracy Day » in support of the miners’ strike and to denounce the government’s  rate
capping campaign.
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government  of  London was gradually bequeathed  to  a  myriad  of  committees  and
organisations, not to mention the boroughs themselves of course.28 Yet it soon became
apparent that even though London had a lot of government, it lacked a central body
capable of providing trans borough coordination. Despite this, having spent so much
energy on getting rid of the GLC, the Conservatives showed no interest whatsoever in
reinstating any sort of central authority.  On the contrary,  after their fourth election
defeat in 1992, the Labour Party began to publicly promote the idea of creating a new
form of central government in London. At first, the subject was broached with great
precaution  given  that  any mention of  a  central  authority would inevitably remind
people of the militant GLC and the darkest hours of the Labour Party. Yet as Labour
firmly established itself as a party of government, the commitment became clearer.29 
Meanwhile, Ken Livingstone was elected MP for Brent East on 11 June 1987 and
in September became a member of the NEC, a seat he retained for two years. It was
only when he lost  it  and returned  to relative political  oblivion that  he once again
became attractive for advertisers and the media, selling ‘Red’ Leicester cheese, while
appearing regularly on the popular television quiz Have I Got News for You.30 He also
appeared  twice  on  stage  with  the  pop  group  Blur  to  sing  Ernold  Same  whilst
becoming friendly with gossip columnists and glossy magazine editors.31 This meant
Livingstone’s return to his former persona of “cuddly Ken”. But, what must not be
forgotten is that keeping a high profile was the only way for him to remain firmly in
the public eye, while at the same time enabling him to supplement his income.32 Both
were to prove vital when the crunch decision came to run as an independent in the
first mayoral elections in 2000. “Crunch” because while everything was done in order
to  block  Livingstone,  he  would  by  far  have  preferred  to  be  the  Labour  Party’s
candidate. But the Millbank Tendency had deemed otherwise.
The idea to create the new Greater  London Authority (GLA) was approved by
referendum on 7 May 199833 and already speculation about the future candidates was
rife. The name Ken Livingstone was on everyone’s lips but initially the man himself
did not seem that enthusiastic about it.34 It was when he realised that Blair was not
going to give him a government position and that come what may, New Labour would
28 For a full diagram see Edward WOOD, The Greater London Authority Bill : a Mayor and
Assembly for London,  House of Commons,  Research Paper 98/115, December 1998, p.  14,
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp98/rp98-115.pdf .  Andrew  HASKEN,  op
cit., p. 288, talks about “272 appointed bodies”. 
29 Voir Timothy WHITTON « La Mairie de Londres : l’exception qui confirme la règle »,  in,
Gilles LEYDIER (dir. de publication), Les Services publics britanniques, Presses Universitaires
de Rennes, 2004, pp. 266-267.
30 Later on, Boris Johnson would also become a celebrity on this particular show. 
31 For Livingstone’s stage appearances with Blur see
http//www.youtube.com/watch?v=IpOEE_bMDS4&feature=related
32 “There’s no business like show business – except politics. Tony will  do his best to look
surprised  as  he  throws  his  arms  round  a  bearded  Yorkshireman”,  The  Independent,  11
November 1999.
33 Timothy WHITTON, « La Pratique référendaire et la Mairie de Londres », Revue Française
de Civilisation Britannique, Hors série n°2, 2009, pp. 67-85.
34 Hansard, 6 juin 1997, col. 717.
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never endorse his candidacy to run for mayor, that Livingstone took the plunge.35 And
once again, it was in the name of democracy. Livingstone used all the contacts he had
made by being “cuddly” Ken to show public opinion that he had been forced to act
alone. On 6 March 2000, he made his case quite clear in the Evening Standard:
I have been forced to choose between the party I love and upholding
the democratic rights of  Londoners.  I  have therefore concluded that
defence of the principle of London’s rights to govern itself requires that
I stand as an independent candidate for London mayor on May 4th.
This  was followed up by a very clear  manifesto commitment (p.1)  to  protect  the
democratic rights of Londoners: “I am standing as an independent candidate because
I believe the job of  the Mayor will be to stand up for London. If  candidates and
policies can be imposed centrally then devolution will mean nothing”.
Livingstone was duly excluded from the Labour Party for a period of five years
and  immediately  launched  his  “purple  bus”  campaign.  The  idea  was  to  represent
Livingstone  as  being  the  ideal  choice  to  teach  the  Millbank spin  doctors  a  good
lesson. Thus, the purple “Hoot for Ken” bus with “Ken4London” and “Vote4Ken”
emblazoned on the side along with its sophisticated sound system and dancers drove
around London and soon became a familiar sight for Londoners. Citizen Ken spoke to
them through  a  loudspeaker  about  saving  the  underground  from privatisation and
resisting  the  Millbank  tendency.  He  also  made  ridiculous  election  promises
emphasising the extent to which he was at odds with New Labour’s party machine:
This is Ken Livingstone, your Labour candidate [ironic pause]. ..sorry,
30 years of habit.
This is Ken Livingstone, your regular cheeky chappy. If you vote for me
the weather will improve dramatically.36
It was a way of connecting with Londoners, a far cry from the traditional methods
used by the party machines. This strategy worked like a dream and on 4 May 2000,
citizen Ken, the David who had taken on the New Labour Goliath was elected mayor
of London. His first words as the third man of England will go down in history: “As I
was saying before I was rudely interrupted 14 years ago…”.
Cockney Ken
Livingstone’s pledge to stand up for the rights of Londoners was to occupy the best
part of his first mandate. His efforts were nonetheless slightly marred by the decision
to stop people feeding pigeons on Trafalgar Square because they had become a health
hazard.37 The press went to town over this issue and published pictures of starving
pigeons  staggering around Trafalgar  Square,  a  far  cry from the stereotype  picture
postcard of children running amidst a flurry of healthy birds. For a time, “red” Ken
35 Timothy WHITTON,  “‘Nightmayor  at  City Hall’ :  les  coulisses  d’une investiture,  d’une
élection  et  d’une  réélection  à  Londres”,  in,  Susan  TROUVE-FINDING,  Les  Coulisses  du
pouvoir, Observatoire de la Société Britannique, n°6, juin 2008, pp. 197-225.
36 Mark  d’ARCY & Rory MACLEAN,  Nightmare,  the  Race to  Become London’s  Mayor,
London: Politicos, 2000, p. 217.
37 “Come  and  have  a  go  if  you  think you’re  hard enough;  the  pigeons  of  London send  a
message to Ken Livingstone”, The Independent, 14 October 2000.
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had to bear the brunt of a formidable media assault and his colour had more to do with
the pigeon blood on his hands than on his revolutionary past.
Initially, Livingstone’s defiance of New Labour took the form of a refusal to accept
the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) that Gordon Brown was so keen on introducing
to renovate the London underground.38 The GLA hounded the government every inch
of the way, running up a considerable legal bill in doing so and only to see its case
thrown out of court. But Livingstone constantly emphasised the fact that his fight was
one of principle to ensure that security in the underground would not be compromised
by the “partial  privatisation plan” as the PPP had been quickly dubbed. 39 He was
cheered  in  and  out  of  court  on  several  occasions  and  came  across  as  being  the
Londoner among Londoners, the mayor whose heart was in the right place because
his priority was London. With Livingstone in command, the GLA was not going to be
a simple lever for the transfer of national policies to the capital city. Opposition to the
PPP also encouraged Livingstone to bring in one of his flagship policies, namely the
congestion charge. As his plan to levy a tax on vehicles entering the centre of London
advanced,  with the setting up of the appropriate  infrastructure,  the mayor  became
more and more isolated. To the extent that the congestion charge began to represent
for him success or failure not only as mayor of London but also as a politician. It goes
without saying that New Labour was all  too eager to point out that  this idea was
entirely the GLA’s and more specifically the mayor’s. Responsibility for the project
lay entirely in his hands which meant that if London became suddenly gridlocked on
17 February 2003, so would Livingstone’s political career.  The black sheep of the
Labour  family would return to the political  wilderness  while New Labour  quietly
cleared  up  the  mess,  making  sure  that  the  GLA came back  under  the  control  of
Millbank.
As it happened, the congestion charge was as successful as any such measures can
be. Very few of the black spots underlined by opponents actually materialised and
financially speaking, the whole project seemed viable. Livingstone was of course on
the right track for a second victory in 2004 but he had also given himself the image of
being  a  sound  manager  of  London’s  affairs:  for  once  a  public  institution  had
organised an economically sound venture along the lines of a private company. No
message could be sweeter to the ears of New Labour except that now they had to find
a way of  bringing Livingstone back into the fold before  the end of  his  five year
exclusion from the Labour Party.
Old Ken and new Ken: Blair’s Olympic mayor
Thanks to the success of the congestion charge, Livingstone reigned almighty over
London  and polls  showed that  under  whatever  banner  he  chose  to  fight  the  next
election, he would win. On 10 September 2003 the Guardian revealed that according
to their research, “he was the most influential man in public services in Great Britain
38 Timothy  WHITTON,  « La  mairie  de  Londres  et  la  décentralisation  du  pouvoir :  enjeux
initiaux et premiers bilans »,  in, Gilles LEYDIER (dir. de publication),  La dynamique de la
dévolution au Royaume-Uni, Université du Sud Toulon-Var, Babel, n°17, 2ème semestre 2008,
pp. 122-123.
39 Livingstone was helped in this task by the American born transport specialist 
Robert Kiley. See Timothy WHITTON, Ken « le rouge » et la Mairie de Londres. Du
Greater London Council à la Greater London Authority,  op. cit., pp. 96-104.
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today” and campaigned for  the Labour  Party to  let  him rejoin.40 The truth of the
matter was that no other candidate had the slightest chance of beating Livingstone and
he held all the cards concerning the various options that the next mayoral election
would  offer.  At  first,  Livingstone’s  reintegration  into  the  Labour  Party  seemed
slightly  bizarre  given  his  popularity.  What  did  he  stand  to  gain  for  renewed
collaboration with New Labour? With hindsight, the gamble paid off at least at the
beginning  because  the  incumbent  mayor  becoming  the  Labour  Party’s  official
candidate for the 2004 election41 meant that antagonism between the GLA and central
government abated somewhat. In this new climate, Livingstone was able to promote
several of his pet projects, namely CrossRail42 and the building of a new toll-bridge
across the Thames, from Beckton to Thamesmead. But most of all, London could now
think seriously about its Olympic bid because no committee would give the Games to
a city where the mayor is at loggerheads with central government.
On the other hand, the risk was that by becoming Blair’s mayor,  Livingstone’s
image of being “our” Ken for Londoners might become slightly tarnished. Old Ken
was somehow being replaced by New Ken and to a certain extent, the disappointment
the electorate felt  about New Labour’s  overall  political  project  was affecting their
approach to the 2004 mayoral election. On realising this, and nearer election day, it
seemed almost on purpose that Livingstone launched into a flurry of declarations that
could only remind people of the days when he got involved with subjects having very
little to do with his electoral mandate.43 It was as if Livingstone deliberately wanted to
reassure his electorate by distinguishing his own brand of politics and image from
those of the Labour Party. The strategy paid off because he won but by a far smaller
margin than in 2000. The gamble had worked but had shown that Livingstone was
cutting it extremely fine.
This second mandate was to witness Livingstone gradually becoming bogged down
both in his relationship with the Labour Party, his own personal brand of cronyism
and allegations of anti-Semitism and corruption that were ultimately to lead to his
downfall. July 2005 saw him reach a summit of popularity when London was given
the Olympic Games even though the joy was bitterly dashed within twenty-four hours
when terrorists  struck  London.  Speaking from Singapour,  Livingstone tore  up his
official speech and told the world in Churchillian tones that never would “his” city
give in to such barbaric acts.  A week later,  in a meeting in Trafalgar  Square,  the
mayor, obviously distraught, gave a speech which provided London with the sort of
leadership that it so needed after the atrocities.44 But within a few days, Livingstone
the statesman had once again fallen from his pedestal by brashly claiming that Great
Britain should take a good look at her foreign policies in order to eradicate terrorism.
40 “Let Ken back on the bus, with Livingstone likely to be elected London mayor again, it
would be absurd for Labour not to let him rejoin”, The Guardian, 24 October 2003.
41 Livingstone was readmitted on 7 January 2004 after  the most  extraordinary sequence of
events.  For  a  detailed  account  see  Timothy  WHITTON,  “‘Nightmayor  at  City  Hall’ :  les
coulisses d’une investiture, d’une élection et d’une réélection à Londres”, op. cit., pp.215-219.
42 This is a colossal project meant to create a high speed rail link between the North-East and
the West of the capital.
43 “Jail Sharon and create 50% top tax rate, says Livingstone”, The Guardian, (final edition), 8
avril 2004.
44 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6BSIBPsbL9c
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This was followed by endless and extremely costly court cases concerning several of
Livingstone’s allegedly anti-Semite remarks. If  Livingstone was cleared each time,
the damage had been done and the mayor of one of the most multicultural cities in the
world was coming across as having lost his grip on what Londoners had come to
expect him to stand for.
Ken versus Boris
In spite of his waning popularity no run-of-the-mill candidate stood the slightest
chance of beating the incumbent mayor in 2008. “Ken” had somewhat reverted to the
more straightforward “Livingstone”, but for the purposes of the election this was soon
to change but not in the way that the mayor would have wanted. The Conservatives
had toyed with several names but knew deep down from the start that this election
would be all about how candidates were represented rather than political programmes.
At  first,  however  ludicrous  the  candidacy  of  Alexander  Boris  de  Pfeffel  Johnson
seemed,  it  soon  became  apparent  that  he  was  exactly  the  sort  of  candidate  they
needed, someone who could personalise his campaign and beat Livingstone on his
own  territory  where  he  excelled,  that  of  representing  London  itself.  Over  time,
Livingstone had come to be the voice of London and no ordinary campaign about
public transport, housing and the Olympic Games would be sufficient to topple him.
And this is exactly what the Conservatives did: while promoting “Boris” rather
than  Alexander  Johnson,  they  systematically  underlined  the  weaknesses  of  the
incumbent  mayor’s  record  and  repeatedly  pointed  out  his  relationship  with  New
Labour, the unpopular political party that the electorate dreamed of punishing.45 Thus
while Livingstone spent his campaign time explaining why Britain was involved in an
illegal  war  with  Iraq  and  why  petty  criminality  was  such  a  problem in  London,
“Boris”  signed  autographs  and  became  a  family  name  thanks  to  his  regular
appearances on Have I Got News For You. Whilst Livingstone found himself caught
up in his good friend Lee Jasper’s resignation from the GLA, Boris candidly asked
why the budget for the Olympic Games was spiralling out of control. In  the same
breath he also promised to bring back the much loved Routemasters while promising
to do away with the much hated bendy buses. This was a particularly efficient tactic
because for many Londoners who had a sense of belonging to the majority, the bendy
buses symbolised Livingstone’s irritating - and costly - devotion to minorities.46 Even
though both men scrupulously avoided attacking the other’s personal life, Boris’ team
45 To the extent that all references to New Labour vanished from Livingstone’s campaign and 
were only barely visible on his posters. For further details see T. WHITTON, Ken « le 
rouge » et la Mairie de Londres. Du Greater London Council à la Greater London 
Authority, op. cit., pp.161-178.
46 Introducing the bendy buses was hugely expensive but they were equipped to give access to
wheelchair  users.  The  general  feeling  of  Londoners,  which  the  anti-Livingstone  press  was
quick to pounce on, was that the ramps were used very seldom. “What the (new non-clowning,
short-haired) Boris should learn from my bus driver wife”,  The Daily Mail, 18 April, 2008.
Despite Livingstone’s efforts to convince them, little did Londoners know that the GLA was
merely bowing to a European directive that states that by 2017, all public transport should be
accessible to wheelchair users. Transforming the old Routemasters would have been far too
expensive and in a television interview, Johnson was very hard put to actually state how much
this operation would cost:
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=spknUcSHYK4
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was nonetheless  quick to pick up on sleaze and cronyism. Apart  from the Jasper
affair,  several  of  the  mayor’s  close  friends  at  the  GLA  had  been  caught  out
supposedly taking advantage of public money and at this stage in the campaign, they
were often on the back foot when it came to proving the contrary.47 The upshot of this
was that Livingstone’s main weakness was emphasised, namely that of coming across
as being an amateur manager of London’s financial affairs. Johnson was managing to
destroy the credibility of “Ken” but the bottom line probably was that he represented
a change, a change from the “Kenocracy” that City Hall had come to represent in the
eyes of Londoners. If Boris were to be elected, he would be the voice of London and
leave financial matters to professionals.
Conclusion
One persona that Livingstone will never shed is that of being “red” Ken. Come
what may, he will go down in British political history as being the epitome of the anti-
establishment, folk hero always ready to defend a cause, the more obscure, the better.
Yet this proved to be insufficient in 2008 when the job of mayor was given to Boris
Johnson, who has become the third man in British politics and who, should David
Cameron become the next prime Minister, will most certainly represent in London the
ideal intermediary for conservative politics. Livingstone on the other hand has joined
the after dinner speakers’ circuit and is busy writing his memoirs. Both, he hopes, will
enable him to remain in the limelight because as the saying goes, he who lives by the
press usually dies by it. 
But Livingstone is hoping to be resurrected for the umpteenth time in 2012 so as to
open the Olympic Games as the mayor of London. This is how he represents his own
personal future yet it will surely depend far more on national politics and Johnson’s
record than Livingstone’s image. This is because he has worn out the ability to appeal
to all men by representing the rainbow mayor of London and any future mandate will
entail “Red Ken” being a more traditional local politician. In many respects this is a
shame because whether one likes Livingstone or not, his populist appeal is extremely
rare and has always enabled him to come across as being a genuine politician, at his
very best in the face of adversity.
At times Livingstone has been his own worst enemy and this perhaps explains why
in  2008,  Boris  Johnson’s  slogan  “Time for  a  Change”  rang  truer  than  “Vote  for
London – Ken”. Livingstone no longer represented London as Londoners thought he
should and therefore he was not able to drum up the support he needed especially in
view of his connivance with New Labour.  Even though Johnson was not the ideal
candidate,  far  from it  given  his  track  record,  the  main  advantage  he  had  was  of
representing an alternative and this was probably the most attractive policy he had to
offer.
47 A GLA employee had had to resign after accepting a trip abroad in a luxury hotel, the GLA
had also  lent  a  room for  the  CND to  host  a  meeting  and  various  community  groups  had
received generous grants. It was also alleged that some GLA employees had worked full time
on Livingstone’s 2004 campaign. All of these were highlighted in the press. Taken separately
these  events  were  meaningless  but  so  soon  before  the  election,  they  were  crucial  in
undermining  “our”  Ken’s  credibility.  For  details  of  the  sleaze  see  Giles  EDWARDS  &
Jonathan ISABY, Boris v. Ken, London: Politicos, 2008, pp. 79-115.
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Timothy WHITTON
ALL “KENS” TO ALL MEN. KEN THE CHAMELEON: REINVENTION
AND REPRESENTATION. FROM THE GLC TO THE GLA
Ken Livingstone’s relationship with the media has always been conflictual but he
undeniably owes them a large  part  of  his  celebrity as  a  non-conformist  politician
poised to defend all causes even the most obscure. Year in, year out, his reputation as
“Red Ken” has enabled him to make the headlines with the press representing him in
a variety of ways and giving him in the process the opportunity to reinvent himself
according to prevailing circumstances.  He is also one of those people who in the
twinkling of an eye  can reach a peak of popularity before falling into a trough of
opprobrium. He took full advantage of this to give the Greater London Council and
then the Greater London Authority a colourful leadership but Londoners finished by
growing weary  of  his  incessant  shock tactics.  When they were  no longer  able  to
clearly distinguish between his politics and his antics, it was time for a change. In this
way the first “third man of the country” had to give way to someone whose greatest
credit was to represent this change.
A CHACUN SON “KEN”. KEN LE CAMELEON : REINVENTION ET
REPRESENTATION. DU GLC A LA GLA
Ken Livingstone a toujours entretenu des  rapports conflictuels avec les  médias
mais leur doit indéniablement une grande partie de sa célébrité d’homme politique
non-conformiste  prêt  à  défendre  toutes  les  causes,  même  les  plus  obscures.  Sa
réputation de « Ken le Rouge » lui a permis, bon an mal an, de faire les manchettes
de  la  presse.  Celle-ci  l’a  représenté  de  multiples  façons  lui  permettant,  parfois
malgré lui, de se réinventer en fonction des circonstances. Il fait ainsi partie de ceux
qui en un laps de temps réduit peuvent atteindre des sommets de popularité avant de
tomber dans les profondeurs de l’opprobre. S’il en a pleinement profité pour donner
un leadership très bigarré au  Greater London Council et puis à la  Greater London
Authority,  les  Londoniens se sont  lassés de ses  éternelles  provocations.  Lorsqu’il
était  difficile  de  faire  clairement  la  distinction  entre  son  action  politique  et  ses
simagrées, l’heure du changement avait sonné. Ainsi le premier « troisième homme
du pays » a dû céder sa place à celui dont le principal mérite était de représenter ce
changement.
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